Organizational Structure and Professional Norms in an Alternative Health Care Setting: Physicians in Health Maintenance Organizations by Barr, Judith K. & Steinberg, Marcia K.
The Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare
Volume 7
Issue 3 May Article 4
May 1980
Organizational Structure and Professional Norms
in an Alternative Health Care Setting: Physicians in
Health Maintenance Organizations
Judith K. Barr
Rutgers University
Marcia K. Steinberg
Rider College
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/jssw
Part of the Clinical and Medical Social Work Commons, Health Policy Commons, and the Social
Work Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Social Work at
ScholarWorks at WMU. For more information, please contact
maira.bundza@wmich.edu.
Recommended Citation
Barr, Judith K. and Steinberg, Marcia K. (1980) "Organizational Structure and Professional Norms in an Alternative Health Care
Setting: Physicians in Health Maintenance Organizations," The Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare: Vol. 7 : Iss. 3 , Article 4.
Available at: https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/jssw/vol7/iss3/4
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND PROFESSIONAL NORMS
IN AN ALTERNATIVE HEALTH CARE SETTING: PHYSICIANS IN
HEALTH MAINTENANCE ORGANIZATIONS*
Judith K. Barr
Rutgers University, Newark
Marcia K. Steinberg
Rider College
The development of new organizational forms for
the delivery of health and medical care in the
U.S. includes health maintenance organizations
(HMOs), designed to provide a set of comprehen-
sive basic health services to a defined popula-
tion for a fixed prepaid premium. As complex
organizations, HMOs have the potential for limit-
ing the autonomy of professionals working in
them. This paper describes the legal require-
ments and organizational mechanisms under which
physicians practice in HMOs and considers the
potential for conflict between the organization
and professional norms.
On the basis of document and interview data from
nine HMOs, it appears that mechanisms developed
to implement the mode of physician reimbursement
and legal requirements for quality assurance and
member grievance procedures do not limit physician
autonomy in these HMOs. Variation was observed
among the three organizational models: staff,
group, and independent practice association.
* A version of this paper was presented at the Annual
Meeting of the Society for the Study of Social Problems,
Boston, August, 1979. The senior author appreciates the
helpful comments of Louis H. Orzack and Ralph Larkin on
an earlier draft. This research was supported in part by
a grant from the Applied Social Research Coordinating
Council, Rutgers University, Newark.
INTRODUCTION
It has recently been argued that a variety of soci-
etal forces are combining to challenge the position of
the medical profession and erode professional autonomy
and control over conditions of practice. These forces
include increasing bureaucratization and government in-
tervention, as well as rising levels of consumer educa-
tion and interest (Haug, 1976; Child and Schriesheim,
1978). One potential source of challenge lies in alter-
native ways of organizing medical practice and the deliv-
ery of services which have been developed as part of the
response to problems in the health care system in the
United States.
Among these alternative forms of health care deliv-
ery are health maintenance organizations (HMOs), designed
to provide a set of comprehensive basic health services
to a voluntarily enrolled population for a fixed, prepaid
premium. Within this concept, a variety of organizational
structures is possible, and different arrangements for
the delivery of care have emerged with physicians pro-
viding services under varying modes of reimbursement.
The purposes of this paper are to describe the organiza-
tional arrangements and legal requirements under which
physicians practice in HMOs, to report empirical evidence
about the implementation of these structural elements,
and to consider the potential for strain between organiza-
tional requirements and professional norms.
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
A considerable body of literature postulates a clash
between the colleague control structures of professions
and the system of hierarchical control characteristic of
complex organizations (Blau and Scott, 1961; Etzioni,
1961; Thompson, 1961). Scott (1966:269) suggests that
professionals may resist bureaucratic rules, reject bu-
reaucratic standards, resist bureaucratic supervision and
give limited, conditional loyalty to the organization.
Various accommodative mechanisms have been identified
which limit strain between professional norms and bureau-
cratic requirements (Litwak, 1961; Scott, 1966). Barber
(1963) notes the existence of differentiated role struc-
tures for carrying out professional work partially sepa-
rated from the organization as a whole and differentiated
authority structures in which professionals serve as ad-
ministrators. Goss (1961) found that hospital clinic
physicians accepted hierarchical authority exercised by
physician administrators over administrative matters,
while maintaining their individual authority over patient
care activities within a framework of advisory relation-
ships with physicians.
How professionals respond in organizational settings
has been linked to various characteristics of the organi-
zation. In his comparative study of occupations, Hall
(1968) found that professionalization and bureaucratiza-
tion were inversely related so that perceptions of auton-
omy were negatively related to hierarchy of authority,
division of labor, formal procedures, and impersonality.
The generalization that the maintenance of professional
norms varies with the level of bureaucratization of the
setting has been supported in the health field. Engel
(1969) observed that perceived autonomy among physicians
varied with three types of bureaucratic settings: solo
or small group practice (non-bureaucratic), a privately
owned closed-panel medical organization (moderately bu-
reaucratic), and a governmental medical organization
(highly bureaucratic). Physicians in the moderately bu-
reaucratic setting perceived the greatest autonomy with
respect to their professional work; Engel concluded that
there may be an optimal level of bureaucracy in which
limits on autonomy are balanced by factors which facili-
tate professionals' goals.
Freidson (1970) has argued that autonomy is the
core characteristic of a profession, that physicians have
exclusive rights over medical practice, and that medical
practice has been organized to facilitate physician au-
tonomy and control.l Larson (1977) has recently argued
iThat these two concepts are empirically, as well as
conceptually, distinct has been demonstrated in the work
of Nathanson and Becker (1972). Following their distinc-
tion, autonomy is defined as freedom from non-professional
determination and evaluation of work activities, whereas
control is defined as influence over organizational pol-
icies and the work of non-professionals.
that professions and organizations are both part of a
process of rationalization of work; therefore, they may
be seen as complementary rather than conflicting modes
of organizing work. From another perspective, profes-
sions are seen as composed of segmented interest groups
moving at different rates to maximize various "profes-
sional" characteristics (Bucher and Strauss, 1961). In
this view, autonomy is not considered an attribute which
necessarily accompanies the functioning of a professional
(Roth, 1974). Rather, this concept is an important dimen-
sion regarding professionals in work settings which can
be studied under varying conditions (Nathanson and Becker,
1972; Madison, et al., 1977).
From any of these perspectives, the extent of profes-
sional autonomy in bureaucratic settings can be considered
problematic. As complex organizations, HMOs are one con-
text in which this issue can be studied.
HEALTH MAINTENANCE ORGANIZATIONS
The term health maintenance organizations was first
described in 1970 (Ellwood, et al., 1971). It incorporat-
ed group practice concepts and prepayment within a new
structural form for the delivery of comprehensive ambula-
tory health care. HMOs were intended to address a variety
of problems, including high costs and lack of accessibil-
ity, and to promote consumer accountability and quality
of care. The Federal HMO Act (P.L. 93-222) of 1973 was
the first effort to put this concept into law. According
to the legislation, an HMO is an organized system for the
delivery of a set of comprehensive health and medical
services under a contractual arrangement with a voluntar-
ily enrolled population for a fixed prepaid premium which
is the HMO's major source of revenue.
In the 1976 amendments (P.L. 94-460) to the law,
three organizational models are delineated, all operating
under the prepayment mechanism but differentiated by
practice site and mode of physician reimbursement (U.S.
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, 1977).
These three models are:
(1) Staff: central facility; physicians are sala-
ried employees of the HMO.
(2) Group: central facility; physicians are part
of a medica group, partnership, or corporation reimbursed
by salary or capitation 2 through the group.
(3) IPA (Individual Practice Association): physicians
practice in their private offices; physicians are part of
partnership, corporation, or association which contracts
with the HMO; and they are reimbursed individualiy on a
fee-for-service basis through the medical group.
The federal HMO law also sets guidelines and regula-
tions which embody organizational requirements that may
affect physicians and the way they practice. Ongoing
quality assurance programs must be established to assure
maintenance of standards and high quality in both the
process and outcomes of care; such programs must ensure
the HMO meets standards for hospitalization set up by
physicians on a community basis. The law also requires
that there be "meaningful" procedures for hearing and
resolving grievances by HMO members, providing a mecha-
nism for member complaints about services or other prob-
lems.
SETTING AND METHODS
Data were gathered from nine HMOs in 1978. They
were studied because they include all operational HMOs
in a single state and are subject to the same state law
and regulations. These HMOs include the three models
specified in the federal law. Five of the HMOs are
federally qualified, and all are state certified.
4
These HMOs had been operational for one to five years.
The number of physicians in staff and group model HMOs
2Capitation refers to a specified amount paid per
enrollee for a specified period of time.
31n 1978, there were 203 HMOs in the U.S. serving
more than seven million people. HMOs had been certified
in 37 states, and 79 were federally qualified. Sixty-
four percent of the nation's HMOs were staff or group
models (U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare,
1978).
4The state HMO law parallels the federal legislation
in requiring a quality review mechanism and a grievance
procedure; it does not require that HMO members be on the
board of directors of the HMO, as required by federal law.
ranged from 12 to 42, and additional specialists were
available for referral in the community. Nearly 600
physicians belonged to IPAs, including both primary care
physicians and specialists. The total number of enroll-
ees ranged from approximately 1,000 to 22,000 members.
The HMOs are located in urban, suburban, and semi-rural
areas.
Sources of data are intensive, open-ended inter-
views with the HMO executive directors and medical direc-
tors, documents provided by the HMOs, and certificates of
authority and annual reports filed with the state depart-
ment of health. Information was collected in three areas
in which organizational requirements may affect physician
autonomy: reimbursement mechanisms, quality assurance
programs, and grievance procedures. These three areas
were selected because they are part of the HMO law and,
thus, constitute legal requirements for the HMOs; also,
these requirements may affect the physician's ability to
set the financial value for his or her work, to make indi-
vidual and independent medical decisions regarding pa-
tients, and to control response to patient complaints
while being more vulnerable to patient demands.
As noted previously, there are findings which suggest
that physician autonomy varies with the degree of bureau-
cratization of the setting, that organizational bureaucracy
includes such characteristics as authority structure and
formalization of rules and regulations, and that there are
mechanisms by which professionals seek to maximize their
autonomy under conditions of organizational constraints.
Accordingly, data were gathered concerning who participates
in establishing reimbursement, quality assurance, and
grievance mechanisms; the extent of codification of the
procedures; who has a role in carrying out the procedures;
and the enforcement of standards.
FINDINGS
The evidence to be presented concerns the implemen-
tation of the HMO concept in three areas: (1) physician
reimbursement mechanisms, (2) quality assurance programs,
and (3) grievance procedures.
Reimbursement Mechanisms
In the staff model, salary negotiation with individual
physicians is carried out by the executive director with
the whole plan balance sheet in mind, or by the medical
director with a budget to allocate among different phy-
sicians. In both cases, the budget is subject to review
by the board which may include lay or nonprofessional
members. Part-time physicians enter the same negotiation
process but are reimbursed by capitation. In the group
model, salary negotiation occurs among physicians in the
group or between a physician and the representative of
the medical group. These negotiations are subject to an
agreement between the medical group and the HMO about
capitation for the group. In both staff and group models,
there were reports that negotiations took into account
the "market value" differential among specialties. In
the IPA model, the medical group contracts with the HMO
for payment on a capitation basis; the medical group then
reimburses individual physicians on a fee-for-service
basis, using a scale based on the "usual and customary"
charges of area physicians. Payment is an amount ranging from
80 to 90 percent of physician charges, with the remaining
funds constituting a risk pool to cover excess costs to
the plan for physicians' services.
Peer Review and Quality Assurance
As guidelines for practice and criteria for review
of physician behavior are established, these may be writ-
ten in the form of a physician handbook or protocols for
practice. Five HMOs have written standards that are dis-
tributed to physicians. These may encompass administra-
tive matters, including guidelines for record-keeping and
rules for scheduling patient appointments, and may specify
HMO services and the processes of monitoring how these
services are delivered. The protocols also tend to set
the tone for medical conduct by stating a general philoso-
phy of medical practice ("...increase the effectiveness
and quality of health care provided") or by listing goals
of the organization (e.g., high quality care, continuing
education for physicians, and patient education).
Standards for medical practice are empirically de-
rived by physicians. The IPAs use standards developed
by physician groups in the community (e.g., the county
medical society); in the staff and group model plans, the
standards are designed by the medical director and/or
staff physicians or are derived from the practice patterns
of the HMO physicians themselves. As emphasized in
several interviews, the standards are intended to be
general guidelines which reflect usual patterns of prac-
tice and are used to detect deviations from these pat-
terns, not to specify step-by-step procedures for patient
care. According to one HMO Certificate of Authority,
"the standard does not define good or bad care. It is
used to ascertain whether or not a chart or other per-
formance is deviant."
Each HMO has a peer review system in which physi-
cians examine their own records and those of their
colleagues in three areas of medical practice: ambulatory
care, hospitalization, and referral to specialists. The
type of review activity, frequency of review, and
person(s) doing the review vary in the different HMOs
studied.
Ambulatory review. The initial screening of ambu-
latory medical records is performed by physicians in all
except two of the plans. In all the HMOs, the quality
assurance review process is carried out by one or more
physicians.5 Review of charts occurs at regular inter-
vals or at the discretion of the medical director, and
frequency of chart review varies from weekly to monthly.
Generally, charts to be reviewed are selected at random,
by disease category or by outcome. The review processes
in these HMOs focus on a variety of items in the charts.
In some plans there is a specific list of items to be re-
viewed, e.g., number of visits, duration of treatment,
and prescriptions. As one medical director reported, in
looking for deviations from accepted standards and pre-
vailing patterns of practice, the physicians want to
"locate weak areas of care."
When a deviation from the standard pattern is found,
or if another problem is noted, decisions about what to
do vary with the particular issue. In the interviews,
executive directors and medical directors reported that
physicians were not reprimanded as if performance had
been judged inadequate; rather the emphasis is on coun-
seling, educating, and advising physicians. Where the
problem is judged to be that of an individual physician,
usually the medical director informally brings it to his
or her attention. For other problems, the medical direc-
51n two plans, nonphysicians also participate in the
quality assurance review process; these include nurses,
medical records personnel, and the center director. This
participation appears to be an administrative role only,
with no input in setting standards.
tor may send a letter discussing the issue to all the
physicians rather than singling out a particular physi-
cian.
The review process is also used as a basis for re-
vising existing standards of practice within the plan.
The review of an individual physician's chart may prompt
a review of the records of all physicians in a specific
area of practice. If patterns of practice behavior are
uncovered that appear to be inappropriate, the group re-
vises the standards. Thus, consensus develops as part
of the review process in regard to standards for practice
and specific problems which are raised in the record re-
view.
While all the HMOs are required to have ambulatory
review procedures, the extent to which these procedures
are formalized as rules of the organization varies. As
suggested by Aiken and Hage (1966), two aspects are im-
portant to consider: the degree of codification of the
rules (as in the written physician protocols) and super-
vision in adherence to these rules (through the quality
assurance and review mechanisms). Physicians participate
in both of these organizational processes. It is physi-
cians who set the framework within which the ambulatory
review process takes place by developing the standards
used to judge physician practice, and they are the ex-
clusive participants in seven of the HMOs studied.
Referrals to specialists. Some type of authorization
is required for all referrals. In-house referrals must
be authorized by the primary care physicians; that is,
there are no self-referrals by patients. Referrals to
specialists outside the HMO must be countersigned, in
most plans by the medical director. This system provides
a formal mechanism for review of physician's work in
regard to appropriateness of referrals. In one instance,
a medical director found that a pediatrician had made an
unusual number of referrals to the orthopedic specialist
because he felt unsure treating these cases. The pedia-
trician was sent for a special course in orthopedics,
part of the rationale being that it is cheaper to keep
simple cases in-house than pay a specialist for referrals.
Referrals to hospitals. A retrospective review of
hospitalizations for enrollees exists in all the HMOs.
Post-admission review of hospital records and authoriza-
tion for the admission is made by a nurse or other non-
physician who reviews the admission for appropriateness
and length of stay according to standards developed by a
designated organization of physicians in the community.
Subsequent concurrent reviews are conducted at specified
intervals to authorize continued hospitalization. This
review process is similar to that for physicians in pri-
vate practice. According to legislation which establishes
Professional Standards Review Organizations (PSROs), post-
admission reviews of hospitalizations for Medicaid and
Medicare patients must be conducted for appropriateness
of service and length of stay (Goran, et al., 1975). Some
states have enacted legislation to permit third-party
payers access to hospital utilization review data, widen-
ing the review process for physicians in private practice.
Grievance Procedures
Consistent with federal and state regulations, there
are formal grievance procedures developed by each health
plan which outline the steps an enrollee may take to reg-
ister a complaint. A written statement of procedures is
provided for the new member; it may be part of the en-
rollee contract, contained in a member handbook, or avail-
able as a separate handout.
In each of the HMOs, the first step is to give the
complaint, in written or oral form, to a designated non-
physician staff member, such as a member services coor-
dinator, who attempts to resolve the complaint. The next
steps in the process vary considerably among the HMOs;
complaints are referred to the medical director, the
center administrator, the executive director, the appro-
priate department head, or a review committee which may
include physicians and/or board members. Consumer repre-
sentatives are involved at this interim stage in five of
the plans. The HMO Board of Directors has final authority
in four of the plans; four have outside arbitration as the
final step, and one has a joint committee as the final
arbiter. In three HMOs, at least one consumer must be
part of the final appeals body. Generally, the medical
profession is represented in the grievance process
through the medical director. In half of the plans, the
medical director has a decision-making role in the formal
process; and physicians have a formal role in the griev-
ance structure in three plans.
Although the grievance system establishes a formal
mechanism for patient complaints, in their operation,
these structures do not appear to have impinged on physi-
cian autonomy. In each HMO, the staff has established
and maintained a distinction between Administrative and
medical matters, usually through informal understandings.
Very few complaints about individual physicians were re-
ported. Whenever questions regarding medical practice
arise, they are referred to the medical director or the
physician department chief for review and resolution.
Most complaints have concerned matters respondents iden-
tified as "process" issues, such as the availability of
after-hours services, appointment waiting times, and
services to which enrollees believe they are entitled.
These complaints are considered administrative matters
and are referred to the executive director, the center
administrator, or the appropriate department head. In-
terviews indicate that most enrollee grievances are re-
solved informally, by bringing the complaint to the
attention of the physician or other staff person.
DISCUSSION
Given the requirements for reimbursement levels,
quality review, and grievance procedures, it might be ex-
pected that in settings such as HMOs, the professional
norm of autonomy would be in conflict with bureaucratic
structures. Data from documents and administrator inter-
views in nine HMOs indicate that physician autonomy does
not appear to be limited by the way in which these struc-
tural mechanisms are implemented.
Although forms of reimbursement vary, physicians
participate to some extent in how they operate. Individ-
ual physician income in staff and group models is set with
the active involvement of the physician. Salary and cap-
itation rates are determined through a process of nego-
tiation rather than through use of fixed, predetermined
scales. In most cases, the physician negotiates with the
medical director rather than the executive director.
Rates for physician services in the IPAs are based on
prevailing fees in the community. In all HMOs, physicians
are involved in setting income levels, permitting the pro-
fession to maintain a degree of autonomy in this aspect of
practice.
Quality assurance systems represent one form of dif-
ferentiated role structure (Barber, 1963) which permits
physicians to maintain autonomy and limits potential
strain between organizational requirements and profession-
al norms. In these HMOs, there is systematized account-
ability to the medical profession; physicians set the
standards for review and carry out the review process.
What constitutes autonomy for the profession may not con-
stitute autonomy for the individual physician. Quality
assurance procedures subject physicians' work to a review
process. Furthermore, the individual physician may be
told to alter aspects of medical work which other physi-
cians decide do not meet group standards. The individual
physician may respond to this as an intrusion into his
practice and an infringement of autonomy, or as an
opportunity to improve work through peer discussion.
Through the grievance system in HMOs, physician be-
havior that might not be subject to challenge by patients
in a solo, fee-for-service practice is potentially subject
to review. Members have contractual rights with the or-
ganization for a set of services, and they can be expected
to make demands which may represent a challenge to physi-
cians (Goss, et al., 1977; Freidson, 1975). It is the
grievance procedure which provides a vehicle for patient
complaints. In these HMOs, few complaints have been
raised about individual physicians. Those grievances
that have been voiced were settled informally, after re-
ferral to the medical director, without going beyond this
first step in the grievance procedure. It seems that in
the daily routines of the HMOs, physician autonomy has
not been challenged by members.
Comparing these structural features among the three
types of HMOs, there is variation (1) in the relationship
of professionals to the organization, and (2) in the degree
of formalization of procedures and the formal role for dif-
ferent organizational participants. As Hall (1968) and
Engel (1969) have shown, such differences, as components
of bureaucratization, may be related to levels of autonomy.
Considering the relationship of professionals to the
organization,6 the IPA is distinguished from staff and
6 1n all the HMOs, a physician serves in the adminis-
trative role of medical director; this position provides
a differentiated authority structure (Barber, 1963), a
professional authority structure to which the physicians
are subject.
group models in several respects. IPA physicians may not
practice in a group setting; only a portion of their pa-
tients are HMO enrollees; they are paid on the usual fee-
for-service basis; and as HMO physicians they are members
of a physicians' group which contracts with the HMO for
the provision of member services. This group has a
formal relationship to the plan, and mutual obligations
between the HMO and the physician members are detailed.
Compared to physicians in staff and group models, the IPA
physicians are more similar to the "ideal type" physician
in terms of practice setting and reimbursement arrange-
ment. They are similar to physicians in the group model
in having a formal contractual relation with the HMO for
the provision of member services as part of a physician
group.
There is evidence of a continuum of organizational
types based on the dimension of degree of formalization
of procedures and rules for quality assurance and member
grievance. The IPA models appear to be the most formal-
ized and structured; the group model is a mixed type; and
the staff model is the least formalized. In the IPA
models, there are written protocols for practice and a
medical group review committee for quality assurance.
The member grievance system includes a formal role for
the medical director and for physicians, and consumers
are included in the final appeals procedure within the
plan. While some of the staff model HMOs have written
protocols for practice and a formal role for the medical
director in the grievance system, none has a formal role
for physicians, and none requires that consumers be part
of the final appeals body within the plan. The group
model HMOs are divided, paralleling the structures in
either the IPA or staff models.
From the data on structure in these HMOs, it appears
that the IPA model offers greater opportunity for main-
taining autonomy of the profession as a whole than do
other models. In one case, the local PSRO is closely
associated with the medical group and sets the review
standards for the IPA, thus consolidating the position
of the profession. Because the IPAs appear to be more
formalized and more structured than the other models,
with physicians establishing and implementing the struc-
ture, it is likely that IPA physicians are less subject
to controls from outside the profession.
The staff models in this study tend to operate on a
more informal basis with fewer prescribed situations in
which physicians participate. Perhaps because the phy-
sicians practice in a central location, communication
and observability may facilitate the development of in-
formal norms which support individual physician autonomy.
Physicians in staff and group models, while subject to
the structural requirements of the HMO, appear to have
the opportunity to participate in implementing these re-
quirements, and in so doing to negotiate their relation-
ship to the organization, thus maintaining autonomy.
Another possibility is that individual professionals may
vary in their conformity to professional and bureaucratic
norms; for example, the HMO staff physicians may value
organizational requirements set forth to promote patient
interests and feel that these do not limit autonomy with
regard to practice.
IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
The bureaucratic structure of HMOs provides a set-
ting in which professional norms may be challenged. From
the available evidence, it appears that physician autonomy
may not be diminished by the structural mechanisms for
physician reimbursement, quality assurance, and member
grievances. Rather, the medical profession, as well as
individual physicians, are involved in defining and im-
plementing these mechanisms. These requirements were
established by the HMO legislation as part of an attempt
to rationalize the health care system and make it more
responsive to consumers by providing accessible high qual-
ity care at a reasonable cost, and in so doing to focus
on prevention of illness and maintenance of health.
The data on HMO organizational characteristics re-
ported in this paper suggest several implications for
these broad goals. The process of negotiating their own
income is one way that physicians may become more aware
of the financial concerns of the HMO, and they may take
these into account in decision-making about individual
treatments. The different hospitalization rates among
staff, group, and IPA models (U.S. Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare, 1978) may to some degree reflect
differential physician participation in financial issues.
On the other hand, physician pressures for higher reim-
bursement may lead to increased costs for the HMO.
To the extent that practice standards become codified
as part of quality assurance requirements, there may be
increased rationalization of medical knowledge. In the
HMOs studied, there were variations in the extent of
codification and the rules for enforcement. Physicians
maintained autonomy in both establishing and carrying
out the quality assurance programs, and no nonphysicians
or consumers participated in a meaningful way in assuring
quality of care. These observations suggest that while
medical knowledge may become more rationalized and physi-
cian accountability more systematized, medical care re-
mains the responsibility of physicians and the medical
profession. It has been suggested that in the face of
policies intended to alter practice patterns, physicians
may maintain dominance while becoming more routinely
accountable (Goss, et al., 1977).
The grievance process in HMOs consists of detailed
procedures which HMO members are informed about and en-
couraged to use. This complaint structure is an entry
point for the consumers of health services to express
objections when they are dissatisfied with organizational
practices and the way services are provided. Yet, in
these HMOs, members have few complaints and those that
are voiced are easily resolved. Whether HMO members are
more satisfied consumers cannot be judged from these data.
It may be that HMOs are more responsive to consumer
interests, or that given a structured opportunity to
register specific complaints, consumers are reluctant to
do so and need more time to become familiar with this
mechanism.
The more rapid rate of growth of IPA models (U.S.
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, 1978:10)
suggests that physicians may be seeking ways to maintain
autonomy of the medical profession in an increasingly
bureaucratic environment. This model allows for decen-
tralized practice sites and traditional practice arrange-
ments (either solo or group practice) while changing the
method of financing to a prepayment mechanism. It is not
clear whether this model will substantially lower costs
and improve quality as well as physician accountability
to the public.
Generalizations from these data are limited by the
number of HMOs and the geographic area of the country in
which they are located. It is suggested that through
physician participation in organizational mechanisms, the
potential for clash between bureaucratic requirements and
the professional norm of autonomy may be reduced. There
is differential participation by physicians in negotia-
ting salary and reimbursement, as well as in the estab-
lishment and operation of quality assurance mechanisms
and member grievance procedures. These variations sug-
gest that individual physician participation in these
mechanisms will be related to perceptions of autonomy,
and that physician responses will vary in the different
HMO models. To study these issues, evidence is needed
about physicians' involvement in organizational decision-
making and their perceptions of autonomy under varying
organizational conditions.
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